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Report on the causes of, and circumstances attending, the 
explosion which occurred at BlaenhirwauD CoUiery, Car­
marthenshire, on 6th S eptember, 1955. 
Th. Right Honourable Lord Mills, K.B.E., October, 1957 
Minister of Pou'er. 
My LORD, 
INTRODUCTORY 
In accordance with the instructions given by your predece�sor under [he 
terms of Section 82 of the Coal M ines Act. 1911, I beg to submit my report on 
the causes of, and circumstances attending, the explosion which occurred on the 
.. Q" face in the Lower Pumpquart seam at Blaenhirwaun colliery, Carrnar­
thcl1shire, on 6th September, 1955, when four persons were killed and 13 others 
injured. One orthe injured died in hospital on the 18th and another on the 30th 
September, 1955, bringing the death roll to six. 
On 23rd November. 1955, Mr. W. Lock Smith, H.M. Coroner for the Three 
Commotts District of the County of Carmarthen. sitting with a jury. concluded 
the holding of an rnquest on the bodies of lhe six deceased persons and recorded 
a verdict 10 the effect that all six had died from injuries accidenlally received in 
a coal gas explosion. the cause of which had yet to be ascertained. 
I.-DESCRIPTION OF THE COLLIERY 
General 
Blaenhirwaun coUiery is situated near the village of Cross Hands some 16 
miles to the northwest of Swansea, near the northern extremity of the coalfield. 
It has been a working mine producing first grade anthracite coal since 1913. 
The output is about 350 tons per day and the numbers of person1j employed arc 
360 below ground and 80 on the surrace. 
l t is served by two verlical shafts. both stink to the Green Vein. The No. I 
shaft, 10 feet in diameter and 155 yards deep, is the upcast equipped with a 
Walker Paddle fan producing about 55,000 cubic feet of air per minute at a 
water gauge of 3·125 inches. The No. 2 shaft, 13 feet in diameter and 212 yards 
deep, is the downcast and main winding shaft for men and mineral. 
Management 
The mine is in the No. 1 Area of the South Western Division oflhe National 
Coal Board, and the principal officials are as follows:-
Mr. J. G. Tait. B.Sc. ... Area General Manager. 
Mr. J. D. H. Davies Area Production Manager. 
Mr. D. I. King ... Deputy Area Production Manager {Opera-
Mr. I. R. Jeffreys 




Seams worked and Lamps used 
The names of the seams now worked. given in descending order, are the Big 
Vein, Stanllyd and Lower Pumpquart. 
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The use of safeLY lamps has always been required throughout the ntine, and 
automatic firedamp detectors arc required by the Coal Mines (Ventilation) 
General Reguli.ltiolls, 1947. to be provided on longwall faces where electric 
power is used. The lamps in general use throughout the m.ine are Nife N.e. 
I J 3C electric cap lamps, with E. Thomas and Williams Cambrian No. 1 flame 
safety lamps and Naylor Spiralarms Type M for use by workmen as firedamp 
detectors. Prestwich Patenl Protector Type 6 flame safety Jamps are used as 
officials' inspection lamps. 
The Lower Pumpquart Seam 
fhe seam has an average thickness of about 3 feet with a roof of elirt and a 
Roor of fircclay. The volatile content of the coal on an asb-free dry basis is 5· 5 
per cent. It was reached by driving cross measure drifls from the Green Vein 
.!Iome 26 years ago and has since been extensively worked by the longwall 
method. The whole of the area worked is geologicaJly disturbed with numerous 
faults, patches of barren ground and steep and variable gradients. 
At (he time of the explosion the workings in the seam consisted OflWO long­
wall. single-unit, conveyor faces, known as the" P " and" Q " faces respec­
tively. These f<lces were ventilated in series, the air current first entering the" P" 
face as shown on Plan No. I. 
H.-THE " Q" FACE 
General Description 
, his face was advancing to the north in a virgin area. It was about 80 yards 
long with the intake loading gate at the right and the return supply gate at the 
left. The gates were advancing to the rise at gradients of ) in 2·5 in the loading 
gate and 1 in 2·' in the supply gate; on the face there was a rise from right to 
left at a gradient of I in 3· 5. The ventilation was ascensiona!. 
The face started as a production unit in January, 1955, and had ad\anced 
about 90 yards. It was the intention to advance it a further 20 yards and then 
replace it by a face, formed by the ribsidc of the loading gate. to advance to the 
east 
Method of Work and Organisation 
The coal was hand-got with the aid of pneumatic picks and of shots fired in 
flanking holes drilled in the solid coal. ]t was filled on to a retarder conveyor on 
the face and conveyed to a tub-loading point by means of two belt conveyors in 
tandem in the loading gate. 1 he face conveyor was comprcssed-air·drivcll and 
the belt conveyors were electrically driven. 
Top rippings were taken in both gates with an additional Hoor ripping in 
the supply gate. Shots were fired in all the rippings. Both gates were supported 
with steel arch girders. 
For the purpose of dust suppression, the pneumatic picks were fitted with 
water feed, hand sprays were used on the face, and fixed sprays at the transfer 
and loading points. Water infusion of the face had been tried but had proved 
abortive due to the fact that the face was advancing on the ends of well defined 
cleats in the coal. 
Tbe face was worked on a 48-hours cyele, and the operations usually 
performed on each of the three shifts were as follows:-
Morning Shift 
7.0 a.l11. lo 2.30 1'.111. 
Coal getting and filling. Ripping and packing 
in the supply gate. 
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Afternoon Shirt ... 
3.0 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. 
Night Shirt ... 
11.0 p.m. to 6.30 a.m. 
... 
. . .  
Ripping and packing in both gales. Withdrawal 
of supports and advancing of strip packs on 
the facc. Moving forward the conveyor on 
alternate days. 
Drilling shot boles and firing shots in coal. 
The face formed a deputy's district on each shift. Except at week�ends, each 
deputy made the pre-shirt inspection ror the succeeding sbift. Tbe .. P" and 
. . Q" faces together formed an overman's district on each of the three shifts. 
Roor Support and Control 
The roof on the face was supported by means of wood bars set at right angles 
to tbe face on wood props. Each of the gates bad solid coal on one side, and on 
the other side a pack, about 10 yards wide, built with stone from the rippings. 
Along the face, strip packs about 6 yards wide were built with stonc from the 
intervening wastes which were about 9 yards wide. Two hardwood chocks were 
maintained at the edge of each waste. Roof control had always been satisfactory 
OD this face and there was no history of roof weighting or falls of ground. 
Ventilation and the Occurrence of Firedamp 
The" Q .. face was ventilated by an air current of about 8,000 cubic feet 
per minute which had aLready ventilated the" P" face. According to all the 
evidence the ventilation has always been adequate, and on only two occasions, 
5th May and 27tb June, 1955, had inflammable gas been detected and reported 
by the deputies. On each occasion a trace of inflammable gas was reported at 
the ripping race in tbe supply gate. 
After the first report of inflammable gas on 5th May, the manager gave 
instructions for a hurdle sheet to be erected and maintained across the roadhead 
of the supply gate so as to divert a Bow of air into the ripping face. llte deputies 
foresaw difficulties in maintaining a hurdle sheet on this steep gradient and 
suggested tbat a small fan installed so as to blow air on to the ripping face would 
be preferable. The manager acquiesced and, on his instructions, a 12-incb 
diameter, Meco, compressed-air turbine fan was installed. This fan, with a 
6-feet length of sheet steel ducting attached on each side, was suspended by means 
of wire from the steel arch supports so that the ducting was approximately at 
the same gradient as the roadway and with the outlet ducting pointing to the 
ripping face. The fan with the ducting was moved forward as the ripping face 
advanced. and this method of ventilating the ripping lip was still in operation 
when the explosion occurred. 
Samples of air taken in accordance with the requirements of Regulation 3 (a) 
(i) or tbe Coal Mines (Ventilation) General Regulations, 1947, since the race 
started in January. 1955, showed a percentage of methane in excess of 0·4 on 
only three occasions; these were 0·55 on 28th May, ) ·10 on 27th June and 
0·7000 19th August. 
Tbe Morning Shift on 6th September 
Tbe morning shift on 6th September commenced at the usual time. The 
pre-shirt inspection bad beeo made by tbe night shift deputy wbo bad reported 
everything in order. The face conveyor had been moved forward on the afternoon 
shift of the previous day, and the strip packs and waste-edge chocks had been 
advanced. The roadside pack of the loading gate had also been advanced. but 
tbe roadside pack or tbe supply gate was about 8 yards back rrom tbe coal race. 
Over a length of a few yards at the return end of the face, the seam had thickened 
from its normal 3 feet to about 7 feet and the slip of what appeared to be a 
downthrow fault had been exposed. running roughly in line with the ribside of 
tbe supply gate. 
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There were 13 colliers engaged in coal getting and two advancing the top 
rippings in the supply gate. Also employed on tbe face were two conveyor 
attendants, one at the drive of the retnrder conveyor at the return end of the 
face and the other at the transfer point at the intake end. There were two men 
getting supplies of timber to the face in the supply gale, and seven men outbye 
of the face on the loading gale and haulage road. These men with the deputy 
and shot firer brought the total in the district to 28. 
111e deputy commenced his first inspection of the face at about 8·0 a.m. and 
\\35 accompanied by the O\crman. Between 9·0 a.m. and 11·30 a.m. the deputy 
made another inspection of the face during which he fired four shots in the coal. 
He was mal...ing a thjrct inspection when the explosion occurred at about 1.0 p.m. 
He maintains that during these inspections and during his shot firing operations 
he made careful tests for inflammable gas and found no trace. This is confirmed 
in respect of his first inspection by the overman who accompanied him. 
The shot firer employed on this face fired an aggregate of 22 shots between 
7.45 a.l11. and 12.20 p.m. He fired 20 of these shots in the coal on the face and 
two 10 the supply gate top rippings shortly before noon. The last coal shots to 
be fired were at the intake end of the face at about 12.20 p.m. All the shots were 
fired singly. The shot firer maintains that he made careful tests for inflammable 
gas dudng his operations and found no trace. 
According to the e\ idence of officials and workmen, there was no sign of 
any roof weighting and conditions appeared normal in every way up to the 
time the explosion occurred. 
m.-NARRATlVE OF THE EXPLOSION 
At about 1.0 p.m. the deputy, making his third inspection aDd travelling 
with the air current, had reached the return end of the face and had found work 
proceeding normally and everything apparently in good order. He was om: of a 
group of nine persons in and about the supply gate roadhead who were suddenly 
enveloped in name and blown ofl· their fecl by the explosion. They all sustained 
severe burn injuries, from which two of them subsequently died, but they were 
not injured by blast. T\\o colliers working together about 25 yards down the 
face from the �upply gate were buried beneath a large fall of roof which occurred 
as a result of the roof supports being displaced and blown downhiJI by the 
blast. When they were recovered from beneath the fall both bodies showed 
evidence of severe burn injuries caused by the passage of the explosion flame 
before the fall occurred. Another collier working some 20 yards farther down 
the face was badly burned and must have died instantly from multiple injuries 
caused by blast. The men working further do\\n the face and at tbe roadhead 
of the loading gate \vere blown downhill and three of them sustained burning 
injuries, but in no case were the inju.ries of a serious nature. The only person 
in the supply gate out bye of the roadhead was one of the two men engaged in 
getting timber to the face; his dead body, badly burned and severely injured by 
blast, was found some 90 yards outbye from the face. 
The positions of the persons in the affected area at the time of the explosion 
are shown on Plan No. 2. 
The alaml was immediately raised by those uninjured in the loading gate; 
help with additional first-aid equipment and stretchers quickly arrived on the 
scene, and the emergency organisation of rescue aDd ambulance services was 
put into operation \\ ithout delay. Despite the difficulties created by the fall of 
roof which blocked the face, all the injured were soon brought out, given 

























district, and conveyed to the surface and thence to hospital. The first aid and 
subsequent treatment of the injured will be dealt with more fully later in this 
report. 
1t lOok until the following day to clear sufficient of the fall of roof on the 
face for the recovery of the bodies of the two men buried beneath it. Both men 
bad obviously been instantly lolled. 
IV.-THE CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION 
The Nature of the Explosion 
All the evidence pointed conciusi\'cly to an cAplasion of firedamp having 
occurred at the top corncr of the face in the vicinity of the supply gate roadhead, 
causing flame and blast to be projected down the face against the air current 
and out bye along the supply gate. There was evidence of the passage of flame 
over a length of about 60 yards of the supply gate measured from tbe coal face 
and o\'er a length of about 75 yards along the face measured from the ribside 
at the return cnd. There was not the shghtest indication tbat coal dust had 
played any part, and the explosion had obviously been one of mcthane. 
Tbe Source of the Methane 
Thc only firedamp detected aftcr the explosion was that issuing In the form 
of a" blower" from the roaf some 20 yard;) down the face from the supply gate 
ribside and near the return·side edge of the roof cavity formed by the fall. This 
Issue of firedamp was of such magnitude-probably about 400 cubic feet per 
minute-that it had to be piped into the return airway before satisfactory \cnti­
lation standards could be restored on the return side of the point of issue. The 
deputy is positive that this gas was not issuing when he passed the spot a few 
minutes before the explosion occurred. Furthermore. had this gas been issuing 
for any appreciable length of lime prior to the explosion, the men working near 
the top corner of the face would undoubtedly have been affected by the high 
concentration of methane which would quickly accumulate there. 
It must be concluded that it was methane from this" blower" which pro­
vided all the fuel for the explosion, and that the" blower" commenced to issue 
only a minute or so before the explosion occurred. It is very unlikely that the 
" blo\\-cr " would have caused pollution of the atmosphere downhill, but it would 
almost immediately have raised into the explosive range the methane content 
of the air current passing. 
The Igniting Medium 
All possible igniting mediums were considered and carefully investigated, as 
follows: 
Safel}' lamps 
All the electric and flame safety lamps which wefe in use in the district at Lhe 
time of the explosion were sent, in the condition in which they were brought out 
of the mine. for examination and testing at the Safety in Mines Research Estab· 
lishment. Many of the lamps had sustained damage, but in all cases the damage 
was found to be consistent with that which might easily be sustained as a 
consequence of an explosion, and no evidence was found to suggest that any of 
the lamps were likely to be the source of an ignition of firedamp. 
Electricity 
All electrical apparatus and mains lighting equipment 10 the district was 
subjected to a thorough cr.amination and found to be in good order. Moreover, 
there was no electrical apparatus or mains lighting equipment in tbe part of the 
distric( affected by the explosion. 
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Nakt'd lights and smoking 
During the recovery operations cigarettes wrapped III pieces of newspaper 
were found In the pockets of two articles of clothing on the face. This focussed 
attention on smoking as an igniting medium, but after careful consideration this 
was ruled out. No evidence was found to suggest that smoking had actually 
taken place tn the district, and the possibility that anyone in the affected part 
at the critical time could have been smoking or attempting to smoke without 
being detected was \ery remote. The finding of contraband in this safety lamp 
mine is, nevertheless, very disturbing. 
Frictional sparks from stones 
Frictional sparking caused b) falling stones was considered and ruled out. 
The only fall of ground found after the explosion was the onc on the face, and 
this must have occurred after the explosion, otherwise the bodies beneath it 
would not have been exposed to the flame. 
Shot firing 
It is certain that 00 shot firing was in progress at the time the explosion 
occurred. Shots had been fired in the top rippings in the supply gate about an 
hour earlier, and consideration was given to the possibility that methane ignited 
by these shots had continued to burn in roof breaks or bed separation planes. 
Nothing was found to support thir, theory and it was eventually ruled out. 
Compresse(/MlIIr hose 
Two lengths of compressed-air hose having patched leaks were considered 
and ruled out after expert examination of the patches at the Safety in Mines 
Research Establishment. 
The compressed-air turbine fall at tlte supply gate rippings 
This was a Meco, Type CF3, compressed-air driven, four-bladed fan, 12 
inches in diameter, in which both rotor and casing ""ere made from an aluminium 
alloy. It was sent exactly as il was found after tbe explosion to the Safety in 
Mines Research Establishment where tests showed it  to be in good running 
order. There were no signs of the rotor having fouled the stater, but each of the 
four blades showed considerable damage by abrasion of its trailing edge, and 
microscopic examination revealed small fragments of rock embedded in the 
aluminium of the blades where recent abrasion had occurred. ln one case a frag­
ment of stone was found embedded in caked dust near the tip of the blade. 
A photograph taken at the Safety in Mi.nes Research Establishment and 
included with this report shows the results of the abrasion and the embedded 
stone (see Plate I). 
The only feasible explanation of this damage seemed to be that, when the 
fan was running in  the supply gate, lhe rotating blades had rubbed against pieces 
of stone \\hich had entered via the autlN ducting and come to rest agamst the 
spiders of the fan casing so as to foul the trailing edges of the rotating blades. 
With the ducting lying at the steep gradient of the gate and with tbe outlet 
pointing to the ripping Hp while tbe ripping shots were fired, the presence of 
pieces of stone in a position to foul the trailing edges of the blades is easily 
explained. Furthermore, one of tbe men working at tbe supply gate rippings 
stated in evidence that. a few minutes before tbe explosion occurred, he noticed 
that the fan appeared to be running sluggishly, so be struck the fan casing witll 
an iron bar whereupon the fan picked up speed. He had done this OD previous 
occasions under similar circumstances and always with the same result. The 
obvious explanation is that stones from the ripping shots had been projected 
into the outlet ducting and were fouling the fan blades, thus causing the sluggish 
running; a blow on the casing moved the stones and allowed the fan to pick up 
speed. The stones would, or course, still be in position to foul the blades. 
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At the Safe�y .in Mines R:esearch Es�ablishment. it  was found impracticable to carry out frictional spark 109 tests with the fan Itself but experiments were 
carried out in which discs of an alloy similar to that used
' 
for the fan blades were 
made to rotate under very light pressure in contact with pieces of slone obtained 
from the supply g�te rippings. The�e experiments proved that at rubbing �peeds 
less than thos.
e whIch .wo.uld. 
occur 10 tbe nor�al running of the fan, sparks were 
produced which readily Ignited a methane air mixture. 
Conclusions 
On this. evi�en?�, couple? with. 
the lack of supporting evidence for any of Ihe 
other possible Ignlllllg medIUms, It was concluded that the explosion had been 
initiated by this fan and Ihat the sequence of events culminating in the 
explosion was as follows: 
At a time when work was proceeding normalJy with the ventilation taking its 
normal course, a blower of firedamp of considerable magnitude suddenly issued 
from the roof some 20 yards down the face from the supply gate. The rate of 
emission was such that within a mjnute or so the methane content of the air 
current on the rcturn side of the point of issue was raised above the lower explos· 
ive limit. SIIIlultaneously, migration of thc firedamp caused a richer and more 
highly explosive mixture to accumulate in the top corner of tbe face. As soon as 
the atmosphere being drawn through the fan became inflammable, it was ignited 
by sparks produced by friction betvveen the trailing edges of the fan blades and 
pieces of stone which had been projected by the ripping shots into the outlet 
ducting and were now fouling the path of the blades. Flame instantly spread 
throughout the inflammable atmosphere and reached the highly explosive accu­
mulation at the top corner of the face. whereupon flame and blast were projected 
down the face and out bye along the supply gate. The men at the top end of the 
face were enveloped ill flame but were 100 near the seat of the explosion 10 be 
affected by blast. 
It may be asked why. with the fan continuing to run aftCT the explosion, 
this sequence of events was nOl repeated. The albwer seems to be that before 
the ventilating current could resume its normal course after being interrupted 
by the blast down the face. the fall of roof occurred. The obstruction caused 
by this fall so reduced the quantity of air flowing that. with the issue of fire· 
damp continuing undiminished, the methane content of the atmosphere 
throughout the area on the return side of the point of issue was above the upper 
explosive limit. Tlus �tate of affairs continued until the fan was stopped before 
steps had been taken to restore the ventilation. 
V.-MATTERS ARISING FROM THE EXPLOSION 
Tbe Compressed·air Turbine Fan 
It is a tragic feature of this occurrence that the�e \�a� !lever any neees.sit) 
for the installation in the supply gate of the fan which IflItlated the explOSion. 
rndeed had there been strict compliance with the requirements of the Coal 
Mines (Ventilation) General Regulations. 1947. it is very unlikely that the fan 
would ever have been installed. 
A fan installed in a gateway of a longwall fa� COUld. not be �emled an 
auxiliary fan as defined in Regulation 18 (I): The m�tallatlon .. of thIS fan was 
therefore governed by Regulation 15 (1) which requITes that No f�n (other 
than an auxiliary fan) may be installed below ground u."les� 
and until. as the 
result of a survey of the ventilation of every part of Ihe mme hable to be alTc�ted 
made al the time by a qualified person and of a report as to the appropriate 
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type. size and location of the proposed fan prepared by a qualified engineer 
the Inana£cr is satisficd that it IS necessary or cxpedient for the proper venula: 
tion of that part of the mine thal il should be installed H. In thc case of thl� 
fan, which could have no appreciable effect on the vcntilation of the district 
and which merely caused turbulence at the rippmg face, it might be open to 
question a:, to whether or not such a survey was imperative, but had such a 
report becn made it IS most unltkely that a fan would have becn installed for a 
purpose which could hu\'c been served equally well, if not better, by the erection 
of a brauice. CeTlalnly, no fan, auxiliary or other, should be instaUed below 
!,.'l'ound without a good deal more thought than was sho\\n in this case. 
Another Important feature of the occurrence is that It directs attention to 
the hazard of frictional sparking caused by foreign bodic.s commg into contact 
with the rOlating bladcs of a fan. 'n this case the blades \Vere made of aluminium 
alloy, but it would appear that tbe hazard would be much the same if the 
blade� were made of iron or stcel. If the ducting leading from such a fan is  
inclined upwards there must always be a possibility that an} foreign body 
entering the open end of the ducting will gravitate to the fan blades. Most, if 
not all. of these fan:, are fitted by the manufacturers with a wire mesh guard 
on the inlet side; it would be a wise p n .. -caution if all these fans were fitted with 
a guard on both inlct and outlet sides. If the apertures in the mesh were as 
small as practicable, lllis particular hazard would be reduced to a minimum. 
Ventilation of the .1 Q " Face 
The amount of ventilation produced on Ihe face was adcquate under normal 
Circumstances but could not be expected to cope with a sudden and unfore­
seeable issue of firedamp of such magnitude as occurred a minute or so before 
the cxploslon. The failure to provide means for ensuring the adequate ventila­
tion of the rcturn end of the face is. however. a maller for serious criticism. 
Due to the geological disturbance and the thickening of the seam from the 
usual 3 fect to about 7 feet at the road head of the supply gate. the thid.,ness 
of the rippingo; in thiS gate had been reduced. This resulted in a shortage of 
pad.lIlg material for the galeside pack which. on the morning of the explosion. 
wa.., about 8 yards back from the coal face. No steps had been talen to counter­
act the natural tendency for the air current to take the shortest route into the 
supply gate and thus by-pass the top end of the face. 
It is only fair to stale that, despite thi!' deficiency in the ventilating arrange­
ments. there is reason to belie\e that the standard of \entilation at the top 
end of the face was adequate up to the time the abnormal issue of methane 
occurred. 
This deficiency dId. however, have an important bearmg on lhe nature of 
the explosion. Had the air current been properly directed into the top corner 
of the face. there would ha\'e been no area out !tide the s\\;eep of the ventilating 
current in which firedamp from the blow'er could accumulate by migration to 
form a highly explOSive mIxture of methane and air. and lhe se\enty of the 
explosion would undoubtedly have been reduced. 
Either additional pacling material should ha\c been imported or, if this 
were impracticable, a braltice should ha\'e been erected and maintained so as 
10 direct the ventilating current to the top corner of the face. 
Contraband and Searching 
rhe f<lct that there were cigarettes 111 the pockets of clothing on this face 
is a matter for serious concern even though it had no bearing on the occurrence. 
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Searching was carried out by the deputies on each shift in accordance with 
an approved system, and .the �ep.Uly. in charge of" Q . . face had. in fact, searched 15 of the men employcd ID his district on the morning shift of 6th September. 
The finding of contraband refl.eels badly on the effcctiveness of the searching, 
�ut even .
more so on the mentalIty of men who would risk taking contraband 
Into a mme \�he re firedamp was, and always IHld been, a hazard. It is to be 
hoped that Ibis occurrence will draw altention to the tragic consequences that 
can result from an ope� spark or flam� produced when methane is present in 
the at�ospherc, and WIll lea.d to.a stricter observance of the law prohibiting the takmg of contraband articles mto a safety lamp mine or part of a mine. 
VI.-FIRST AID AND SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT OF 
THE INJURED PERSONS 
As soon as n�ws
. 
of the occu'!ence reach.ed the surface of the mine, the emergency orgamsatlon was put mto operation and functioned smoothly. 
Arrangements were made for additional first-aid men and equipment to be 
sent forthwith to the" Q " district where an emergency dressing station was 
quickly set up in the .; Q .. passbye. Within about half an hour, Dr. Ivor Evans, 
in practice at Pcnygroes. and Dr. Sheehan, in praclice at Cross Hands, arrived 
at the colliery. They immediately went below ground and proceeded IQ the 
.• Q" district where they rendered most valuable assistance at the emcrgency 
dressing station. 
As the injured were brought to the surface they were seen to by Dr. R. 
Thomas, of Pcnygroes, assisted by Mr. Schofield, who was in charge of the 
surface first-aid room, and nursing sisters from neighbouring collieries before 
being conveyed by molor ambulance to Morriston General Hospital. The last 
of the ambulances left the colliery at about 5.0 p.m. During the night the nine 
most serious cases were transferred to the Plastic Surgery Unit at St. Lawrence 
Hospital. Chepstow. 
A tribute was paid by the Superintendent of the Morristol1 General Hospital 
to the excellence of the first-aid treatment which the injured had received before 
admittance. 
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I have the honour to be, My Lord. 
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